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THE PRESENT WORLD COURT SITUATION
The league is established on an enduring basis. Its activities widen with the passing years. Despite internal strife naturally to be expected, with occasional manifestations of petulance,
it acquires vigor, its deliberations become more and more significant.
The annual meetings of the assembly, generously attended
by premiers and ministers of foreign affairs, promote those intimacies so important in crises in international relations; they
afford a forum for the discussion of international problems in
which every speaker is perforce obliged to profess the attachment of his country to the cause of peace. The small nations,
equally with the great, may be heard. Their statesmen have
made notable contributions to the work of that branch of the
league.
The council already assembled whenever conferences of the
leading powers seem advisable, is performing its functions in
the delicate task of keeping the world at peace. The peaceloving, warweary nations of Europe are enamored of the league.
'Whether it will go to smash some day when controversies between two or more of the great powers defy adjustment, no man
is sufficiently gifted to say.
That it is a powerful agency for peace none not warped by
inveterate prejudice or ignorant of its history will deny. It is
getting along nicely without the support of the United States.
It is doubtful if it would have functioned more effectively or
successfully had our country been a member from the beginning.
As most of the problems threatening world peace are European
or involve the European powers, it is quite likely that had
America been a member she would have studiously held aloof
from them, at least as far as conditions would permit, engaging
tactively in the humanitarian work of the league and in its efforts
to secure general recognition of the principles of international
law.
The loss flowing from our policy of isolation has been ours,
not the league's. We have been playing and are doomed to play
a secondary and subordinate part in all movements for world
betterment-arresting the spread from one country to another
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of contagious diseases and suppressing or controlling the traffic
in opium, in women and children and in obscene literature,
regulating the traffic in arms, codifying international law and
above all, the institution of a permanent court of international
justice.
It is quite to be expected that the proponents of any project
requiring the co-operation of the nations generally will envoke
the league as the most convenient and expeditious method of
securing the necessary assent and equally to be expected that
when secured the league will be empowered to carry it out, the
organization for setting it on foot being at hand in some of the
activities of the league of the nature indicated we have grudgingly participated for very shame at having no hand in world
enterprises approved by the common opinion of mankind.
There are reasons other than our insistence on the payment
of loans made during and since the war to the nations associated
with us in it for the hatred exhibited toward us among them,
notwithstanding the relief so lavishly extended by our people
to those suffering from the devastation wrought by that cataclysm in the causation of which we had no part either near or
remote.
How can we expect to be regarded with any warmth of
friendliness by the people of Europe when we maintain a position of aloofness while they set on foot a plan to establish and
maintain a permanent international court, an institution repeatedly extolled by our statesmen and by the leading jurists of the
world as a most desirable, if not an indispensable agency for the
preservation of peace, our attitude, as in'the case of other equally
commendable enterprises to which we contribute nothing, having
no better basis than that it was inaugurated under the auspices
of the league. It is deeply to be regretted that the effort to give
to the tribunal thus set up and which has not functioned successfully for four years the prestige of the moral support of the
United States has apparently come to an impasse.
I trust it will not
elucidate the situation
which there is no little
among those who might
formed.

seem inappropriate to this occasion to
with respect to the effect concerning
confusion in the minds of many, even
be expected to be quite thoroughly in-
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Pursuant to the injunction of the covenant the Council of
the League of Nations, calling to its aid a committee of experts
-international jurists of renown-prepared a statute or constitution for a permanent court of international justice which,
after being approved by the assembly, was submitted to the
various powers for their indorsement to be expressed by signing
a protocol or treaty through which those thus assenting became
sponsors of the court.
After approximately fifty nations had so become participants in the establishment, and maintenance of the court, President Harding in February, 1923, asked the Senate to advise and
consent to the United States becoming a signatory to the protocol
with four reservations or upon four conditions proposed by Secretary of State Hughes, as follows:
First. That the United States should, by signing, assume
no relationship with the League of Nations or any obligation
under the covenant thereof.
Second. That the United States should be entitled to participate in the election of judges of the court.
Third. That it should pay its fair share of the expenses of
maintaining the court, and that the United States might at any
time withdraw its adherence.
Fourth. That the statute of the court should not be
amended without its consent.
The senate advised and consented to the signing of the protocol with the Hughes reservations, and another, for convenience
numbered five, which reads as follows: "That the court shall
not render any advisory opinion except publicly, after due
notice to all states adhering to the court and to all interested
states and after public hearing or opportunity for hearing given
to any state concerned; nor shall it, without the consent of the
United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion
touching any dispute or question in which the United States has
or claims an interest."
As this reservation has proven the chief obstacle to an unqualified acceptance by the other signatories to the treaty, of
the conditions upon which the United States proposed to join
them, a study of its provision is essential to an understanding
of the ease as it stands.
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The covenant of the league in its provisions directing the
initiation of proceedings for the establishment of the court declared that, in addition to hearing and deciding controversies
which might be submitted to it by the nations involved, it should
have power to give advisory opinions on request to either branch
of the league, and in general terms, the court was, by its organic
statute, invested with such authority.
The power thus reposed in the court was made the basis of
attack upon it-perhaps the main basis--in the debate in the
Senate on the resolution of ratification. Some few American
courts of last resort are authorized by the constitutions under
which they exist to render such opinions, upon the request of the
legislature or governor, to aid or guide in the discharge of their
or his duties.
The prevailing American opinion, however, as indicated in
constitutions, state and federal, is against reposing such power in
courts, an inherited prejudice, no such practice being known in
the English system. It is argued that it is the function of attorneys-general to advise the executive or the legislature, and that
courts ought not to commit themselves, either as to the validity
or the construction of statutes or to express an opinion on the
law unless in bona fide cases before them.
It is said that it is difficult, indeed, impossible to anticipate
the infinite variety of circumstances under which the principle
involved may be presented, -and that contentions made concerning it are much more safely tested when the facts to which it is
to be applied are before the court.
Moreover, and this perhaps constitutes the most forceful
ground of objection to such a grant of power, the court might
and often would be unaided by the discussion of opposing counsel, each diligently advancing every consideration favorable to
his contentions, ingenious in meeting the argument of his adversary. Indeed under the system in vogue in some states the court
hears no argument.
So strong are the predilections of the American bar touching
the exercise of such a power by the courts that both Senator
Root, in the discussions before. the committee of experts, of which
he was a member, -which framed the statute of the court, and
Honorable John Basett Moore, a member of the court since its
institution, in the exchanges occurring in connection with the
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preparation of its rules, expressed misgivings as to the wisdom
or propriety of investing the international court with authority
to render advisory opinions to the league.
It should, however, be stated that both acquiesced, realizing
that some concessions must be made in such a work of statesmanship, and both have been reassured by the manner in which the
power has been exercised by the court. And it may be added
that the system, whatever may have been its origin, has vindicated itself. It has been proven that it may be a valuable aid
to the resolution of a dispute involving, often as a controlling
element, a question of international law, the determination of
which may render comparatively easy an amicable adjustment.
The court might conceivably respond to a request for an
advisory opinion without giving interested parties an opportunity to be heard or without publicity, in camera as it is expressed
on the continent, but its rules provide that notice must be given
to all members of the league and to all other nations that may
appear to be interested, implying a right on their part to be
heard, and that its opinions must be publicly announced.
Those rules, however, are subject to change and the opponents of ratification did not omit to call attention to the fact that
it was advanced by one of the judges when they were being prepared that a situation might arise when it would be in the interest of peace that the determination of the court should not be
made public, at least at the time it was reached. Though this
suggestion appears to have had scant support it was thought best,
at least to still apprehensions in this country, to crystallize the
rule through a reservation which on being accepted by the other
signatories would have the force and effect of a statute of the
court.
Hence the first paragraph of the fifth reservation, as follows:
"That the court shall not render any advisory opinion except publicly, after due notice to all states adhering to the court and to' all
interested states and after public hearing or opportunity for hearing

given to any State concerned."

The second paragraph thereof, reads as follows:
"Nor shall it without the consent of the United States, entertain
any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute of question
in which the United States has or claims an interest."
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Four of the leading powers, Great Britain, France, Italy
and Japan have permanent places on the council on which it was
contemplated in the covenant the United States should likewise
always be represented. Remaining outside the league our country has no seat therein. It was understood at the time reservation V was proposed and adopted that unanimity in the council
is necessary to the adoption of a resolution to submit to the court
a request for an advisory opinion, the covenant providing that
questions of procedure before the council or the assembly may
be determined by a majority vote, on all others unanimity being
required.
In this view it may be said there was general concurrence
in the Senate. It may have been advanced that a contrary view
was arguable, but the opposition, fertile in objections to the
plan under which the court was organized, offered none in seriousness based upon a doubt as to whether a bare majority of the
council may call for an opinion from the court.
It will, then, be realized that if a unanimous vote in the
council is requisite that a request for an advisory opinion be
submitted to the court, any nation represented thereon may impose a veto. If it is proposed to submit a question the determination of which might for any reason be embarrassing to Great
Britain or to France or Italy or Japan, or even to one of the
lessor powers holding temporary membership in the council, it
may offer a forbidding nay, though every other nation votes
contrarywise.
It was thought that the United States should be equallv
privileged, indeed, that it would otherwise be in on a footing of
inequality. But it refrained from asking as much, contenting
itself with reserving the right to object only in case it should be
proposed to submit a question in which it had or claimed an interest.
It restricted itself in accordance with its policy of not interfering in the .controversies of European powers, the fruitful
source, as heretofore remarked, of business for an international
court. The reservation carried an implication of perfect willingness on the part of the United States to let the other powers
represented on the council submit to the court, or not to submit,
as they saw fit, a question of law involved in a controversy, for
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instance, between Italy and Jugo-Slavia, or between Germany
and Poland.
Some criticism has been directed against the Senate by
Americans emotionally attached to the cause of the court for
having imperiled adherence by offering Reservation V, but
among them are few, I venture to say, who understand its purport or the conditions giving rise to it.
The action of the Senate was regularly communicated to the
powers signatory to the protocol with a view to elicit their assent
to the conditibns under which the United States proposed to
adhere. Several small nations have signified their acceptance
of the terms, but the remainder withheld any official expression
to await the result of a conference at Geneva looking to unanimity among them in their replies, or at least to an exchange of
views concerning the proposed American reservations.
The conference was called by the council of the league to
which Secretary Kellogg had transmitted information of the
action taken by the Senate, on the proposal to adhere and of his
having sought the assent of the governments of the countries involved.
At the meeting of the council following the receipt of the
letter of Secretary Kellogg referred to, the British Foreign Minister, Sir Austen Chamberlain, remarked that Reservation V
was susceptible of an interpretation which would hamper the
work of the council and prejudice the rights of members of the
league, though he expressed the conviction that it was not intended it should bear any such meaning.
He suggested that the correct interpretation of the reserva•tion be made the subject of discussion and agreement with the
United States. The Secretary of the league, presumably at the
direction of the council, sent an invitation to our government to
participate in the conference, taking pains, doubtless in view of
his experience and in recognition of some sensitiveness of which
he could not be unaware, to explain that it was not to be a league
conference, but a conference of the powers signatory to the protocol.
The invitation was declined, the President through the secretary of state saying that the "reservations are plain and un-
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equivocal" and that he had no authority to" 'modify" or "interpret ' them.
It is, of course, quite true that the President has no authority to modify a draft of the treaty as it had the approval of the
Senate, or to interpret it, if by interpretation is meant to give it
a construction of binding force and effect. But undeniably he
has plenary power to negotiate with a view to either a modification or an interpretation, using the term in the sense indicated,
which was the limit of what he was asked to do.
It did not follow that the conference would result in any
proposal either to change or to "interpret."
All hesitancy
about accepting the reservations might have been removed by a
frank exchange of views and a free discussion of the reservations. To say the least the reply betrayed no warmth of desire
to see the United States a supporter of the court.
The conference unaided by any one speaking from the standpoint of the United States recommended the unconditional acceptance of the first three reservations and of the first part of
the fourth, according to the United States liberty to withdraw
its adherence at any time. As to the second part of the fourth
reservation, to the effect that the statute of the court should not
be amended without the consent of the United States, it was
proposed as a substitute that the statute be amended so as to
provide that no amendment -thereof should be made without
the consent of all the signatories, that all might in that regard
be on the same footing.
In the debate in the Senate it was advanced that the clause
in question was unnecessary, the protocol being a multiparty
treaty which, under universally accepted rules, can not be
changed without the consent of all signatories. This view was
expressed with out dissent in the conference, but to remove all
doubt and to dispel even the appearance of a favored position on
the part of the United States, the alternative was proposed to
which there can, of course, be no possible objection, though a
resubmission of the protocol to the Senate would be imperative
that its assent to the substitute might be secured.
Reaching the fifth reservation, the conference assented to
the first part thereof, heretofore quoted as follows: "FifthThat the court shall not render any advisory opinion except
publicly, after due notice to all states adhering to the court
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and to all interested states and after public hearing or opportunity for hearing given to any state concerned;:" proposing to
add: "The court shall render advisory opinions in public sessions," apparently overlooking the fact that the reservation so
provides.
The second part of the fifth reservation gave rise to not a
little discusgion before the conference. Misgiving concerninig
it was assigned as a reason for calling the same. It reads, to
repeat, as follows: "Nor shall it, without the consent of the
United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion
touching any dispute or question in which the United States has
or claims an interest."
The propriety of according to the United States the same
right as that enjoyed by other signatories represented on the
Council or in the Assembly, for that matter, should it be asked
to request an advisory opinion, was recognized, but it was advanced that it had never been decided whether unanimity is
required in order that such a request may be submitted to the
court or whether a bare majority vote suffices.
If, it was argued, a majority vote only is required, the
United States would, were the reservation accepted, occupy a
position denied to other signatories. Reciting that it was
realized that the United States was seeking only equality of
right, it was proposed in effect, that if unanimity is required,
if any nation represented on the Council or in the Assembly, as
the case may be, may veto the submission of a request for an
advisory opinion, the United States should be accorded such
right, but that if a majority vote only is required, it should be
entitled to a single but not necessarily determinative vote.
Such uncertainty concerning the state of the vote necessary
to the submission of a request having been suggested, the representative from Belgium very sensibly proposed that the question be by the Council submitted to the court for determination.
The doubt, if there be a doubt arises by reason of the provisions
of the Covenant governing the proceedings of the Council and
the Assembly that at meetings thereof questions of procedure
may be decided by a majority, other decisions requiring the
agreement of all members present.
The idea advanced by the Belgian representative, M. Rolin,
brought an observation from Sir Cecil Hurst, speaking for Great
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Britain to the effect that the proposal to have the doubt removed
by an authorative adjudication in advance, required reflection
and careful study.
Continuing in language in which diplomatically an objection
is understood to be made without objecting, he remarked that
his hesitaney might perhaps be due to his Anglo-Saxon indisposition to be committed to general principles, and to his predilaction for the policy of deferring, but to await the decision of any
question of law or perhaps of policy until a resolution was required through its involvement in an actual case or controversy
demanding determination or solution.
I listened at the meeting of the Assembly in September,
1925, to Sir Austen Chamberlain assigning similar grounds for
the declination on the part of Great Britain to subscribe to the
Geneva protocol of the year before, and recalled the saying attributed to Talleyrand that language was made to conceal thought,
not to express it. It could not have failed to occur to most of
Sir Austen's auditors that Great Britain having departed so
far from her historic policy, as he outlined it, as to subscribe to
the Covenant of the League of Nations, must have had some additional reasons she did not care to avow for rejecting the protocol.
It may be idle to speculate on whether Sir Cecil Hurst disclosed in. full the basis of the objections of the government he
represented to the perfectly logical course proposed by MV.
Rolin.
However, it proved effective, barring temporarily at least, an
accord, and, what is worse, it is impossible to divest the occurence of a sinister aspect.
If it means anything, it means that Great Britain desired to
reserve the right, as the exigencies of the future might suggest,
without embarrassment to contend that unanimity is or that it
iv not essential to affirmative action on a proposal that an advisory opinion be asked of the court, affording its enemies an opportunity to charge that the notion previals, even among its leading
supporters, that it is subject to influence other than such as
result from open debate before it.
It is to me an astonishing thipg that it should even be proposed that nations deliberately enter into a treaty under which
their rights and obligations should be left in doubt. Experience
has shown that it is well nigh impossible to frame a treaty,
statute or contract over the construction of which controversies
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may not arise. It is the business of the lawyer draftsman to anticipate such as to guard against them by appropriate provisions.
In the field of diplomacy it is by some thought to be clever
to introduce ambiguity which will permit the assertion of claims
that, were they made during the negotiations, would wreck them
or be disposed of by the use of unmistakable language. It is
charged in the debate on the Panama Canal tolls bill that the
Hay-Pauncefote treaty had been couched in language that would
not preclude the parties to it from making diametrically opposite
claims concerning its construction. It was against the practice
advertised to that our hero set his face when he declared in
happy phrase for ,"open covenants, openly arrived at."
The signatories to the covenant and to the protocol are now
involved in obscurity, such as it is, as to whether any one of them
may or may not veto a request for an advisory opinion by the
assembly, or by the council, assuming it is represented therein.
Why should the United States not so embarrassed deliberately
assume the same position of uncertainty, particularly when that
uncertainty may be so easily removed?
The occasion ought to be eagerly seized to dispel whatever
doubt there may be rather than to await its presentation in connection with some possibly heated controversy, when through
the passions aroused by' such the decision of the court might be
made the subject of acrid and disturbing criticism. There would
be no adversary parties should the council, for the enlightenment
of the signatories now considering the American reservations,
Neek the advice of the court concerning the meaning of the language of the organic law of the league in the particular referred
to. Undoubtedly the most eminent international lawyers would,
at the request of the court, as amici curia, present the opposing
views concerning the question at issue.
Our Supreme Court, finding itself recently confronted with
a serious question of constitutional law, mooted since the organization of our goyernment, arising out of a conflict between the
executive and the legislative branch, the former being ably represented before the court by the solicitor general and the latter only
differently by counsel for a private claimant, the chief justice
requested the chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate
to procure some member equipped for the task to present the
argument in support of the authority claimed by the Congress
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and denied by the President. Senator Pepper obligingly undertook the work and discharged it with lawyer-like fidelity, and
with such ability as to win for him the unsual honor of being
complimented in the opinion handed down by the court.
It should not be inferred from what has been by me said,
nor from what has been learned of the discussions before the
Geneva Conference, nor from any action taken by it, that the
question at issue is particularly intricate or the correct solution
open to grave doubt. It turns upon what is "procedure" before
the council or the assembly which, it will be recalled may be
determined by a majority vote.
Procedure before courts and deliberative bodies comprises
that system of rules pursuant to which they discharge their functions, adopted either by the tribunal or body or prescribed for
its government and regulation by law. Codes of procedure governing courts provide how causes may be brought before them,
whether the claimant may state only his cage for which he asks
relief or whether he must reduce his claim to a formal complaint
in writing; how the party impleaded shall be notified, how and
when he shall answer. A multiplicity of details are provided
for arising out of the experience of the courts through the
centuries.
Similarly in the criminal law the procedure prescribes how
the accused shall be charged, whether by indictment, information
or informal complaint, how he shall be brought into court and
admitted to bail, if the offense charged against him be bailable,
how he may attack the accusation whatever form it assumes,
what plea le may make and how and when he shall be tried.
So the Senate of the United States has adopted rules for the
orderly transaction of its business and reasonably to ensure considerate attention to the legislation to which it is asked to give
its approval.
The Permanent Court of International Justice has adopted
a code of rules regulating the procedure before it, including rules
in relation to requests for advisory opinions, the following being
of interest in this connection, namely:
"Art. 72. Questions upon which the advisory opinion of the court
is asked shall be laid (before the court by means of a written request,
signed either by the president of the Assembly or the president of the
Council of the League of Nations, or by the secretary general of the
League under instructions from the Assembly or Council."
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"The request shall contain an exact statement of the question
upon which an opinion is required, and shall ibe accompanied by all
documents likely to throw light upon the question."
"Art. 73. The registrar shall forthwith, give notice of the request
for an advisory opinion to the members of the court, and to the
members of the League of Nations, through the secretary general of
the :League, and to the states mentioned in the annex to thq covenant."

I am not advised whether the council of the league or the
assembly has established rules governing the procedure before
them respectively. Presumably they have, but obviously such
rules can not undertake to settle the question as to whether the
council shall or shall not, in any particular case, submit to the
court a request for an advisory opinion.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the opinion of
Kring v. Mjissouri quoted the opinion of a law writer defining
procedure as follows: "The word means those legal rules which
direct the course of proceeding to bring parties into the court
and the course of the court after they are brought in."
I dare say the view, if it is seriously entertained by any
one, that to request or not to request, is a matter of procedure,
arised from attributing undue weight to the fact that such request is not infrequently preferred as an incident to the solution
of a controversy of which the council has either by the consent
of the parties or otherwise taken jurisdiction.
In such a case it may be assumed that the council reflects
en the question, "how shall we proceed? Shall we determine
the whole controversy embracing the question of international
law involved, resolving it according to our best judgment, or
shall we seek first the opinion of the court ?."
It must not be overlooked, however, that a request for an
advisory opinion may be preferred by the council when, there is
no general controversy before it. The request is not incidental
to any matter upon which the council is deliberating. It is the
very thing to be decided and the only thing. If the council
were asked by some signatory to the treaty to request an opinion of the court on the question here discussed, not for the guidance of the council, for there is no matter pending before the
council with respect to which it needs the guidance which would
be afforded by such an opinion, it is difficult, if indeed it is pos1107 U. S. 221, 232.
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sible, to conceive of its complying or. not complying as being a
matter of procedure, which is, in its very nature, incidental.
There was no controversy before the council inducing it to
submit any one of the first three requests it sent to the court.
They all arose out of controversies before the International Labor Bureau, on whose suggestion they were preferred, and called
for the construction or interpretation of certain provisions of
the Treaty of Versailles. The fourth advisory opinion was rendered at the instance of two states between which a difference
had arisen of which the council had indeed taken notice, tho
the submission took place just as if the matter had otherwise
been strange to it.
Great Britain and France being at odds concerning whether
certain decrees authorized by the French government in Tunis
and Morocco affecting subjects of Great Britain were violative
of treaty rights of the latter, the powers joined in a request
that the council seek the opinion of the court on the question at
issue. It was undoubtedly contemplated from the beginning
that the court should, through the exercise of this jurisdiction,
aid states engaged in an amicable effort through diplomatic
channels to settle differences that had arisen between them and
which they had neither occasion nor desire to submit to the arbitrament of the council.
The covenant carries no specific provisions for the adjustment or settlement of controversies by or before the assembly,
though the council is entrusted with extensive powers in that
regard.
It was apparently not designed that the assembly should
sit as a tribunal before which specific disputes should be heard.
Yet under Article XIV, imported into the statue of the court,
the assembly may request its opinion as well as the council. It is
indisputable that a request for an opinion may be preferred
quite apart from any proceeding pending before either the council or the assembly, the sole question before either being whether
the request shall or shall not be submitted. In such a situation
the determination can not possibly be with respect to a matter
of "procedure."
In the views here expressed I am able to say that ex-Senator
Elihu Root concurs. Of the contention which gave rise to hesitancy in accepting unqualifiedly the American reservations
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David Hunter Miller remarked, "It seems to me to be in principle wholly unfounded; certainly authority is lacking." If the
question should be submitted to the court, and it should adopt
the view in the light of which the reservations were proposed,
unconditional acceptance by the signatories might be looked for,
the other suggestions of the conference offering no serious
obstacles to complete agreement.
It is unnecessary to speculate on what course the President
ought to take or the Senate would take in the event the court
held unanimity is not required. It is easily conceivable that a
question might be submitted to the court by a majority of the
council, the determination of which, were the United States one
of its sponsors, would cause it some embarrassment, as for
instance whether the acquisition of territory by another power,
such as that the report of which gave rise to the Magdalena Bay
incident, is forbidden by international law.
Perhaps it would be equally embarrassing to Great Britain
to have submitted the question raised by an Irish representative
at the meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1925 as to
whether, if she became involved in a war, any of the other autonomous units of the British empire, being members of the League
of Nations, and maintaining diplomatic relations with other governments, might proclaim their neutrality, and enjoy the rights
and privileges of neutrals.
The suggestion of the Geneva conference to put the United
States on a footing of equality with a vote in the council on a
proposal to submit an inquiry to the court, with whatever force
a vote by any member may have, is by no means as just as it
might seem, assuming a majority only to be required for action.
The association of the representatives of the State's members of the council in its work, the obligations arising out of
controversies in the past and the hope of favors earned or unearned in the future of actual understandings with reference
to the same would operate altogether to the disadvantage of the
United States in a contest for votes in the council. It is in the
last degree doubtful that its responsible agents would care to
enter into an agreement through which our government might
be driven to such a disagreeable necessity.
The Conference prepared a draft of a protocol which it
proposed, as it is understood, should take the place of the Ameri-
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can reservations, expressing in lieu thereof the conditions and
agreements under which the United States adheres to that by
virtue of which the Court exists. It fails in a number of particulars to meet the situation as it arises from the assent of the Conference to certain of the American proposals, a discrepancy that
need occasion no concern, though it might, were there no more
substantial differences, result in some delay. The paragraph
dealing with advisory opinions widens the gap, as it appeared
from the discussions and conclusions of the Conference. It as
follows:
"Should the United States offer objection to an advisory opinion
being given by the Court, at the request -of the Council or the Assembly, concerning a dispute to which the United States is not a party,
or concerning a question other than a dispute between states, the
bourt will attribute to suoh objectioi, the same force and effect as
by Council."
a Member
opinion giventhe
attaches to a -vote against asking for the
of the League of Nations either in -the Assembly or In

This paragraph would deny to the United States a vote on
the submission of a dispute to which it is a party. If that dispute turned upon or involved a question of international law
which the United States declined to submit to the Court, it
could nevertheless be submitted by the council at the instance
of the other party in the form of a request for an advisory opinion. Doubtless this opinion was inserted in view of the rule in
the IMosul case, in which the Court held that though unanimity
is required in reaching the final result before the Council, the
votes of state parties to the dispute cannot be counted. As
heretofore explained, the United States, not being entitled to
participate in the debates of the Council, would- be at a disadvantage under such a rule, a constituency that might vote, but
could not speak in a parliamentary body would be only half
represented. It .would be still further handicapped were it entitled to vote on only one question. In the second place under
the proposed protocol, the United States would have no vote in
the case of the submission of a question over which two or more
states dispute. Nothing in the discussions before the Conference seems to warrant any such restriction on the rights of the
United States, denied to no state represented on the Council..
Generally speaking, the draft accords to the United States rights
it has not asked and does not care to exercise, and withholds
the very privileges the Senate deemed essential to safeguard
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the interests of our country in -view of its position outside the
League.
It is quite likely that the presence of some one competent
to speak the -views of the reflecting friends of the Court in the
United States at the Conference, though he occupied no official
position would have results in the dissipation of all minor differences. It seems altogether probable that an accommodation
cannot be reached on those of a graver nature, in the absence
of a determination by the Court of the legal question heretofore
herein canvassed.
Washington, D. C.
TicomAS J. WALSH,
United States Senator from Montana.

